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Clicks and Tricks
HOW COMPUTER HACKERS AVOID 10b-5 LIABILITY
“You don’t need to be a Wall Street insider to pull off
insider trading anymore.”1
INTRODUCTION
Over a five-year period, two hackers residing in the
Ukraine hacked into several newswire services that housed
press releases containing sensitive financial information. The
hacks occurred before the press releases were to be disseminated
to the public in order for the hackers to capitalize on the
valuable information they contained.2 Once they acquired the
press releases, the hackers distributed them to various traders
located in several countries across the world including Russia,
Malta, France, the Virgin Islands, and Cyprus.3 The traders
then executed a series of securities transactions on the basis of
that information and realized over $100 million in profits.4 The
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) described this chain of
conduct as unprecedented because it had never seen an insider
trading case whose conduct lasted that many years, spanned
that many countries, and reaped that much profit.5
It’s not every day that the SEC describes an act of
insider trading as “unprecedented.”6 But in many ways that’s
exactly what the story of the Ukrainian hackers was: a
comprehensive insider trading plot orchestrated by a
1 Klint Finley, Hackers Busted in Insider Trading Scheme, WIRED (Aug. 11,
2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/hackers-busted-insider-trading-scheme [https://perma.
cc/MFA3-JEG].
2 Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Law at 21–23, SEC v.
Dubovoy, No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015) (explaining the financial
value of the information the hackers stole).
3 Id. at 2–5 (listing the trader defendants and their locations around the world).
4 Id. at 22–25.
5 U.S. Charges 9 with Insider Trading Based on Hacked Press Releases, NBC
NEWS (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/u-s-charges-9insider-trading-based-hacked-press-releases-n407771 [https://perma.cc/RMA8-SRLH].
6 See id. (quoting SEC chief Mary Jo White) (“Today’s international case is
unprecedented in terms of the scope of the hacking at issue, the number of traders involved,
the number of securities unlawfully traded and the amount of profits generated.”).
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“sprawling network of hackers and traders”7 spanning the
globe, who unlawfully siphoned over 150,000 news releases from
servers belonging to three different U.S. newswire services to
facilitate the execution of illegal trades at seemingly impossible
speeds,8 yielding millions of dollars in illegal profits. This story
depicted a broader scope of crime, a staggering number of
trades, and an immense amount of profits unlike anything the
SEC had seen before. While the amount of profits earned by
these illicit actions appears the most unsettling, there is another
part to the story that is even more striking.
Insider trading is prohibited by Section 10(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act9 (the Securities Exchange Act) and
Rule 10b-5, which criminalizes the use of a manipulative or
deceptive device “in connection with the purchase or sale of”
securities.10 Computer hackers have been prosecuted under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 before—when they traded on
stolen information themselves11—but never when they sold the
information they acquired instead. The two Ukrainian hackers
represent a new breed of hacker, the so-called hacker-seller.
Charging these hackers under 10b-5 becomes complicated
because their conduct does not occur “in connection with” a
securities transaction; therefore, they seemingly circumvent
liability under the securities laws.
There are two primary theories of 10b-5 liability—the
classical theory and the misappropriation theory—under which
a defendant may be charged with insider trading; these
theories complement one another and apply depending on the
type of defendant.12 The Second Circuit recently devised a third
theory of liability called the affirmative misrepresentation
theory,
which
attaches
liability
to
affirmative
7 David Porter, Group Made $30 Million with Hacked Press Release Info in
Insider Trading Scheme: Feds, NBC 4 N.Y. (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.nbcnewyork.
com/news/local/Hack-Insider-Trading-Securities-Arrest-Millions-Dollars-Computer-SystemIndictment-New-Jersey-New-York-321390061.html [https://perma.cc/2UM7-2R2A].
8 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 32 Defendants in Scheme to Trade on
Hacked News Releases (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-163.
html [https://perma.cc/CM9K-5G59] (explaining that one trade occurred a mere thirty-six
minutes between the newswire’s receipt and release of an announcement projecting an
earnings loss and realizing $511,000 in profits).
9 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
11 See, e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2009).
12 The classical theory pertains to corporate insiders (permanent employees
who work for the firm or company in question) and the misappropriation theory pertains
to corporate outsiders (non-insiders who “owe[ ] a duty of trust and confidence to someone
other than the issuer and its shareholders”). Greg Kramer, Insider Trading: Examining
Primary Theories of Liability, N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.newyorklawjournal.
com/id=1202588045359/Insider-Trading-Examining-Primary-Theories-of-Liability [https://
perma.cc/S9LX-Q7RC].
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misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.13 This theory, unlike the classical or misappropriation
theories, does not require a breach of fiduciary duty to the source
of the information.14 Hacker-sellers, however, fall outside all
three theories of insider trading liability because they do not owe
a fiduciary duty to anyone and they do not personally trade on
the information they wrongfully acquire.
Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act is the aiding and
abetting provision, which enables the SEC to prosecute those
who “knowingly or recklessly provide[ ] substantial assistance to
another person” who violates the Act.15 This provision more
appropriately captures the hacker-seller’s wrongful conduct than
10b-5 does because it depicts a more accurate characterization of
that conduct. 10b-5 prohibits certain conduct related to the
“purchase or sale” of securities, but the hacker-seller neither
purchases nor sells securities; instead, they sell the information
they wrongfully acquire to another person, the trader, who then
makes the trade that is prohibited by 10b-5. The hacker-seller is
effectively aiding and abetting the securities violation committed
by the trader; thus, Section 20(e) is a more conducive part of the
Exchange Act to prosecute hacker-sellers than 10b-5 is.
Part I of this note traces the history of insider trading
law from its origins in the 1933 Securities Act (the Securities
Act) and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. This part places
particular emphasis on how insider trading law has gradually
stretched the scope of its liability from the classical theory to
the misappropriation theory to the even more expansive
affirmative misrepresentation theory. Part II distinguishes the
hacker-seller as a new type of insider trading culprit that the
theories described in Part I are ill-equipped to punish. Part III
offers two alternate solutions that would also convict hackersellers under the securities laws, but challenges their use
because of their ability to be easily abused by prosecutors. Part
IV proposes that prosecutors should use the aiding and
abetting theory as a more effective way to charge the hackerseller with insider trading. This part also discusses several
policy considerations in support of this theory, and for charging
all hackers, including hacker-sellers, under the Securities and
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49.
In classical theory cases, the defendant, a corporate insider, owed and breached
a fiduciary duty to their own company. In misappropriation theory cases, the defendant
owed and breached a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, who may or may not be
a corporate insider. Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading:
Legal Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 151, 157–60 (2011).
15 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012).
13

14
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Exchange Act in addition to computer crimes and/or wire fraud
statutes. This note concludes that the aider and abettor theory
leads to the most effective prosecution of hacker-sellers by
the SEC.
I.

BACKGROUND ON INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY

The United States Congress enacted the Securities Act
in 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act in 1934 in the
aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929 amid “reports of
widespread abuses in the securities industry.”16 Congress
passed these two landmark acts with three objectives in mind:
“To provide fair and honest mechanisms for the pricing of
securities, to assure that dealing in securities is fair and without
undue preferences or advantages among investors, . . . and to
provide, to the maximum degree practicable, markets that are
open and orderly.”17
Although commonly understood as the trading of a
public company’s stock or other securities by individuals with
access to nonpublic information about that company, insider
trading was not specifically defined in either the 1933 or 1934
Acts.18 Instead, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, along with
Rule 10b-5 thereunder (promulgated by the SEC in 1942),
proscribe several fraudulent practices “in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.”19 The SEC designed 10(b) as a
“catch-all” provision to prevent fraudulent practices within the
securities market.20 Thereafter, these ambiguous statutes were
left to the courts for interpretation, who have spent the last
seventy-plus years “establish[ing] clear boundaries for
prosecution” under the acts,21 namely defining what type of
conduct constitutes insider trading and who can be charged with
it.22 This section illustrates how those boundaries have been
stretched by the classical and misappropriation theories of
16 Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
170–71 (1994).
17 H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91–92 (1975).
18 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1934); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1940).
19 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016); see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78b (2012).
20 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202–04, 206 (1976).
21 1 BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT
ACT OF 1988, at 9 (1989).
22 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)
(describing 10b-5, as related to insider trading, as “a judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn”).
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insider trading liability adopted by the Supreme Court, and by
the affirmative misappropriation theory introduced by the
Second Circuit.
A.

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Classical Theory
1. The Disclose or Abstain Rule

The cases of In re Cady, Roberts & Co.23 and SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur canonized the “disclose or abstain” rule
that the classical theory stems from.24 The rule—requiring an
insider to disclose material nonpublic information before trading
based on such information or abstain from trading if disclosure
is not possible—represents the classical theory at its earliest and
broadest point.
In In re Cady, Roberts & Co., the SEC found that Gintel,
a partner at the brokerage firm of Cady, Roberts & Co., had
violated Rule 10b-5 when he sold several shares of Curtiss
Wright Company stock after one of its directors, who was also a
director of Cady, Roberts, told him about Curtiss Wright’s
impending dividend cut.25 In so doing, the SEC articulated
what became known as the “disclose or abstain” rule: an insider
who possesses material nonpublic information must disclose
that information to the proper authorities before trading on it;
if they do not disclose, they must abstain from trading.26
The Second Circuit formally adopted the “disclose or
abstain” rule in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., holding that
anyone who possesses material nonpublic information about a
company must either disclose that information to the investing
public or abstain from trading in that company’s stock.27 The
court harkened back to the legislative intent of the 1933 and 1934
Acts in its reasoning, explaining that this standard protects the
integrity and fairness of the marketplace by ensuring investors
have relatively equal access to material information.28
The breadth of the disclose or abstain rule adopted in
Texas Gulf Sulphur meshed well with the all-encompassing
language of 10b-5.29 Congress crafted the statute using ambiguous
language that did not define specific conduct as illegal insider
trading. This decision gave the SEC a wide net with which it
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

In re Cady, Roberts & Co., No. 8-3925, 40 SEC Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961).
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC Docket at 909, 911.
Id. at 911.
Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
Id. at 858–60.
Id. at 859.
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could characterize several types of trading as insider trading
violations when done using material nonpublic information.30
Texas Gulf Sulphur paired seamlessly with the statute and
expanded the SEC’s net even further by holding that anyone
would be liable for insider trading under 10b-5 if they did not
follow the disclose or abstain rule.31
2. The Rise of the Fiduciary Duty Requirement
The disclose or abstain rule lasted a mere twelve years
until the U.S. Supreme Court rejected it in Chiarella v. United
States.32 Vincent Chiarella worked as a financial printer hired
by corporations to fill out paperwork for takeovers.33 After
deciphering code names assigned to several acquisition targets,
he purchased shares in the target companies and sold them for
significant profits once the tender offers were announced to the
public.34 The Second Circuit convicted Chiarella of insider
trading under 10b-5, but the Supreme Court reversed.35
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell articulated the central
tenet of the classical theory: “one who fails to disclose material
information prior to . . . a transaction commits fraud only when
he is under a duty to do so.”36 Furthermore, “the duty to
disclose arises when one party has information ‘that the other
[party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other
similar relation of trust and confidence between them.’”37
Chiarella’s conviction could not stand because “he was not a
fiduciary” and therefore did not owe the target shareholders a
fiduciary duty to disclose.38
Chiarella’s fiduciary framework served two key
purposes for the Court. First, it dramatically reduced the
categories of persons who could be charged under 10b-5,
thereby preventing what Justice Powell saw as prosecutorial
overreaching by the federal government using the wide net of
Texas Gulf Sulphur.39 Second, it allowed for traditional

Id.
Id. at 848.
32 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
33 Id. at 224.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 225.
36 Id. at 228.
37 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1976)).
38 Id. at 232.
39 Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s
History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 872 (1995) (explaining how
30
31
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corporate insiders to continue to be prosecuted if they trade on
confidential information for their own financial gain.40
Chiarella’s fiduciary framework was reaffirmed in Dirks
v. SEC.41 Dirks was a security analyst for a broker-dealer firm
who learned from Ronald Secrist that Secrist suspected his
former employer, Equity Funding of America, of committing
securities fraud.42 He shared his knowledge of the alleged fraud
with a number of his clients, thereby tipping them off, and the
clients promptly sold their shares to avoid losses.43 Like Mr.
Chiarella, Dirks was not a fiduciary to the shareholders he
tipped off, but the SEC attempted to distinguish the two cases
by arguing that tippees like Dirks become obligated to disclose
the receipt of inside information from a corporate insider to the
shareholders.44 Therefore, in a callback to the pre-Chiarella
conception of insider trading, the SEC argued that “anyone
who knowingly receives nonpublic material information from
an insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading.”45
Writing for the majority again, Justice Powell reversed
the SEC’s conviction of Dirks under Rule 10b-5 for “tipping”
material nonpublic information about Equity Funding of
America.46 The Court disagreed with the SEC holding that its
theory was in conflict with the central tenet of Chiarella; not
everyone who trades on material nonpublic information has a
fiduciary duty towards the shareholders to disclose that
information.47 This tenet was refined in Dirks to mean that not
everyone has an inherent fiduciary duty to disclose.48 The Court
held that corporate insiders have an inherent fiduciary duty to
disclose material nonpublic information before trading, and
they are not allowed to give such information to outsiders who
use it for personal profit.49 Tippees, on the other hand, acquire
that fiduciary duty “when the insider has breached his
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information
Justice Powell “deliberately” crafted the classical theory to curb the government’s use
of “10b-5 as a general weapon against unfair information advantages”).
40 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (“Application of a duty to disclose prior to
trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the
shareholder’s welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent use
of material, nonpublic information.”).
41 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
42 Id. at 648–49.
43 Id. at 648–51.
44 Id. at 656.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 657–58.
47 Id. at 655, 658–59.
48 Id. at 659–60.
49 Id.
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to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there
has been a breach.”50 In this way, the tippee’s liability is
derived from that of the tipper.51
The Supreme Court, however, also recognized that not
all disclosures by corporate insiders violate the fiduciary duty
of shareholders.52 Echoing a sentiment from Cady, Roberts that
the securities laws were enacted to eliminate the “use of inside
information for personal advantage,”53 the Court held that only
improper disclosures are breaches of fiduciary duty.54 An
improper disclosure, the Court reasoned, was one from which the
insider will personally benefit from, directly or indirectly.55 The
Court used this newly invented “personal benefit” requirement to
overturn Dirks’s conviction, finding that the official who tipped
him off did so to expose his employer’s fraud instead of trading
on the information for personal gain.56 Accordingly, Dirks could
not be prosecuted under 10b-5.57
The Chiarella and Dirks cases premised the classical
theory on who was breaching their fiduciary duty rather than on
whether the insider’s actions constituted that breach.58 Therefore,
the Court felt that it could extend this theory to all people who
could be considered insiders, including employees and agents of
the corporation.59 It could not, however, be extended to anyone
considered an outsider of the company; therefore, those outsiders
could trade on nonpublic information without fear of prosecution
under 10b-5.60
B.

A Bigger Step Forward: The Misappropriation Theory

The misappropriation theory is a second, alternate
theory of insider trading liability that captures corporate
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
52 Id.
53 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., No. 8-3925, 40 SEC Docket 907, 912 n.15
(Nov. 8, 1961).
54 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660–61.
55 Id.; see also Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of
Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1329–30 (2009) (describing the advent of
the “‘personal benefit’ requirement as sharply distinguish[ing] a fiduciary’s breach of
the duty of loyalty (which would trigger Rule 10b-5 liability) from a breach of a
fiduciary’s duty of care (which would not result in a Rule 10b-5 violation)”).
56 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
57 Id.
58 Nagy, supra note 55, at 1329–30.
59 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14. (“Under certain circumstances, such as where
corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer,
or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of
the shareholders.”).
60 Nagy, supra note 55, at 1330.
50

51
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outsiders—people who do not work for the company whose
securities are illegally traded or people considered temporary
insiders under Dirks61—who trade on the basis of material
nonpublic information. Although the Court did not adopt this
theory until United States v. O’Hagan in 1997, its first
interaction with it was in Chiarella.62 In his concurrence,
Justice Stevens argued that Mr. Chiarella had violated 10b-5
by breaching a duty of silence that was “unquestionably owed
to his employer and to his employer’s customers.”63 In essence,
Justice Stevens believed Mr. Chiarella was guilty because he
had defrauded the acquiring companies who supplied the
tender offers and who trusted that same employer to maintain
the confidence of that information.64 Chief Justice Burger
advocated the “fraud-on-the-investors” approach,65 an even
broader version of the misappropriation theory than Justice
Stevens’s “fraud-on-the-source” approach.66 In Justice Burger’s
view, Mr. Chiarella did not defraud the companies who
supplied the tender offers but, instead, defrauded the investors
with whom he traded by exploiting his knowledge of the tender
offers—knowledge that the investors lacked.67 Like Justice
Powell, Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger did not focus
on the conduct that would have amounted to a breach of
fiduciary duty and focused instead on the players involved in
the transaction. However, they came to opposite conclusions on
who was being harmed by the fiduciary’s breach. The Court did
not decide whether either conclusion could be a viable
alternative in Chiarella,68 and before answering that question,
it had to first determine whether the misappropriation theory
itself was a viable alternative to the classical theory. A circuit

61 In a footnote to the Dirks opinion, Justice Powell listed “an underwriter,
accountant, lawyer, or consultant” as examples of temporary insiders. Dirks, 463 U.S.
at 655 n.14.
62 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589,
1601–02 (1999) (explaining that the theory’s roots are commonly traced to Chiarella,
Bainbridge notes Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Chiarella is also thought to be its point
of origin, but, as I explain, its actual origins lie in Justice Stevens’s concurrence).
63 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
64 Id.
65 Nagy, supra note 55, at 1330.
66 In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued that the duty to disclose should
be triggered “when an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior experience,
foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means.” Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
67 Id at 243–45.
68 Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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split emerged over the next seventeen years resulting from that
very question.69
The Supreme Court resolved the split in O’Hagan by
formally endorsing the misappropriation theory, but it chose to
do so based on Justice Stevens’s fraud-on-the-source theory
instead of Chief Justice Burger’s fraud-on-the-investors theory.70
James O’Hagan was a partner at a large Minneapolis law firm
who learned that one of his firm’s clients, Grand Metropolitan,
was planning a tender offer for shares of Pillsbury Corporation.71
O’Hagan subsequently purchased several shares of Pillsbury
stock and sold them for $4.3 million after Grand Metropolitan
publicized the tender offer.72 A jury convicted him of insider
trading under Rule 10b-5, but the Eighth Circuit overturned
the conviction, holding that the misappropriation theory was
an invalid premise for 10b-5 liability.73
The Supreme Court disagreed and endorsed the
misappropriation theory in reversing the Eighth Circuit.74
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg held that this
alternate theory creates 10b-5 liability when a person commits
fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security” by
misappropriating confidential information in order to trade on it,
thereby breaching a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the
information.75 In Justice Ginsburg’s view, that fiduciary duty,
unlike the fiduciary duty owed by corporate insiders under the
classical theory, is premised on “a fiduciary-turned-trader’s
deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential
information.”76 O’Hagan had a duty of trust and confidence to his
69 In United States v. Newman, the Second Circuit agreed with Justice Stevens
and affirmed the 10b-5 convictions of employees of an investment banking firm who
misappropriated information about potential mergers to three traders and shared the
profits made from purchasing the stock of the upcoming merger targets. United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16–18 (2d Cir. 1981), aff’d 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983). The court
held that the employees violated a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the merger
information, the investment bank and its clients from whom they stole the information. Id.
By 1991, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits threw their support behind the misappropriation
theory, too. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d
439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990). In 1995, however, the Fourth Circuit rejected the misappropriation
theory on the grounds that it would hold misappropriators liable without satisfying the
deceptive device requirement because there would be no “‘misrepresentation’ or
‘nondisclosure.’” United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 949–50 (4th Cir. 1995).
70 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 682 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
71 Id. at 647.
72 Id. at 648.
73 United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 614, 617 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d by 521
U.S. 642 (1997), remanded to 139 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998).
74 Id. at 655.
75 Id. at 655–56 (alteration in original).
76 Id. at 652.
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law firm and, by extension, his firm’s clients, and violated that
duty by trading on the nonpublic information he obtained for
personal gain.77 The Supreme Court held that his actions
satisfied the “deceptive” requirement of Section 10(b).78
The
Court
in
O’Hagan
also
advocated
the
misappropriation theory as a new method to endorse the efficient
market policy considerations that underlie the Securities Act and
the Securities Exchange Acts.79 Justice Ginsburg stressed that
the theory was designed to “protec[t] the integrity of the
securities markets against abuses by ‘outsiders’ to a corporation
who have access to confidential information that will affect th[e]
corporation’s security price when revealed.”80 This protection,
she reasoned, would promote investor confidence because
investors would be reluctant to trade in a market where the use of
misappropriated nonpublic information is “unchecked by law.”81
The Court in Chiarella restricted insider trading
liability to corporate insiders who owe a fiduciary duty to the
source of material nonpublic information.82 O’Hagan expanded
the range of activities that give rise to that fiduciary duty, and
in so doing, expanded the class of insider trading defendants to
include corporate outsiders that misappropriate nonpublic
information “in connection with” securities transactions.83 But the
Court declined to expand insider trading liability to those who
lack a “fiduciary-like nexus” to the source.84 In the modern age
it is precisely these outsiders, particularly hacker-sellers, that
present the greatest threat to the market because they do not
need to have a connection with the source of the material
nonpublic information to obtain it.
C.

Expansion to “True” Outsiders: The Affirmative
Misrepresentation Theory

A critical question in the wake of the O’Hagan decision
was whether the misappropriation theory actually applied to
true outside traders, those who did not owe a fiduciary duty to
the source of the information. The Second Circuit’s decision in
SEC v. Dorozhko provided an answer that question; its opinion
Id. at 659.
Id.
79 Id. at 653 n.5.
80 Id. at 653 (alterations in original) (quoting Brief for the United States at
14, United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842)).
81 Id. at 658–59.
82 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
83 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.
84 Nagy, supra note 55, at 1320.
77
78
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simultaneously limited the scope of the misappropriation
theory and created a new complimentary theory—known as the
affirmative misrepresentation theory—that was not premised
on a breach of fiduciary duty.85
The facts of the case are a good example of a true
outsider whose 10b-5 liability was not considered by the
O’Hagan court. In early October 2007, IMS Health, Inc.,
announced that it would release its third-quarter financials on
October 17, at 5:00 p.m., and Thomson Financial, Inc. would
manage the release.86 On that afternoon, Oleksandr Dorozhko—
a Ukrainian citizen—hacked into a server at Thomson
Financial, stole the IMS Health earnings report set to be
released at 5:00, and subsequently bought $41,670.90 worth of
put options of IMS Health stock.87 The next day, after IMS
Health released its lower-than-expected third-quarter earnings,
Dorozhko sold the put options six minutes after the opening bell
for a profit of $286,456.59.88 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York denied the SEC’s request for
a preliminary injunction to prevent Dorozhko from accessing
his newly acquired profit.89 The court held that “computer
hacking was not ‘deceptive’” because it did not have the requisite
breach of a fiduciary duty of disclosure.90 Dorozhko had no
affiliation with either IMS Health or Thomson Financial and,
therefore, had no fiduciary duty to disclose.91 Because there was
no fiduciary duty, there was no breach.92
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the district court, finding that computer hacking could be
considered a deceptive device under 10(b).93 Controversially, the
court also held that breaching a fiduciary duty of disclosure was
not a requirement for insider trading liability, saying, “what is
sufficient [to prove liability under 10b-5] is not always what is
necessary.”94 The Second Circuit distinguished Dorozhko from
the Supreme Court precedent that the district court relied on,
stating that those cases involved fraud based on a breach of
fiduciary duty of disclosure.95 Finding that no such duty existed
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45 (citing SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
Id.
Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
Id.
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 51.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 48–50.

2017]

CLICKS AND TRICKS

1317

for Dorozhko in the case at bar, the court agreed with the SEC
and characterized Dorozhko’s actions as fraud based on affirmative
misrepresentation.96 Essentially, Dorozhko misrepresented himself
to access Thomson Financial’s computer system, appearing as a
person who could legally access the earnings report but who in
reality had no such permission to do so.97
The court also discussed the relevance of Dorozhko’s
method of hacking to his liability under 10b-5.98 It held that if a
person misrepresents his identity to gain access to a server and
then steals information off of the server to trade on it, those
actions would be “plainly ‘deceptive’ within the ordinary meaning
of the word” and thus prohibited by 10b-5.99 However, the court
remanded the question of whether “exploiting a weakness in an
electronic code to gain unauthorized access is ‘deceptive’” and
prohibited by 10b-5 to the district court.100 On remand, the SEC
moved for and was granted summary judgment, and the
question was never answered.101
As in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan, the deciding court
also bolstered its new theory of insider trading with policy
considerations. The Second Circuit stated that the affirmative
misrepresentation theory is consistent with “the Supreme
Court’s oft-repeated instruction that Section 10(b) ‘should be
construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate its remedial purposes.’”102 It is unlikely that the
authors of the Security Act and the Securities Exchange Act
contemplated Dorozhko’s actions, but it is likely that they
crafted the acts with broad enough language to imbue 10b-5
liability on him nonetheless.103
The classical, misappropriation, and affirmative
misrepresentation theories have stretched the boundaries of
insider trading liability well beyond its original restriction to
corporate insiders. Of the three theories, the last is perhaps the
broadest and most aggressive expansion of insider trading

Id. at 49–51.
Id. at 44, 49.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 51.
100 Id.
101 SEC v. Dorozhko, Release No. 21465, 2010 WL 1213430 (Mar. 29, 2010).
102 Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49 (quoting SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002)).
103 Alan Turing, often considered the father of modern computers, did not
write the paper that first described the principles of modern computing until 1936.
A.M. Turing, On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the
Entscheidungsproblem, 42 PROC. LONDON MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 230, 230–65 (1936).
The Securities Act was promulgated in 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act in 1934.
96
97
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liability.104 By abandoning the fiduciary realm of the classical and
misappropriation theories, the affirmative misrepresentation
theory expands liability to true outsiders who lack the “fiduciary
like nexus” required by those theories.105 Dorozhko is an example
of such an outsider, a hacker who had no fiduciary allegiance to
the company whose information he stole, IMS Health, or to the
company that housed the information that he stole, Thomson
Financial.106 His liability, therefore, falls outside of the classical
and misappropriation theories because it cannot be premised on
their fiduciary principles; he is, however, liable under the
affirmative misrepresentation theory because he fraudulently
misrepresented himself as a person who could legally access the
inside information held by Thomson Financial when he hacked
into the server. As the next part demonstrates, however, the
affirmative misrepresentation theory does not capture all types
of computer hacking.
II.

A NEW APPROACH TO AN OLD CRIME: WHY THE HACKERSELLER DOES NOT FIT UNDER THE THREE MAJOR
THEORIES OF INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY

Although the advent of the classical, misappropriation,
and affirmative misrepresentation theories expanded the limits
of insider trading liability, the case of the hacker-seller falls
outside the domain of those theories for three reasons. First,
they do not owe a fiduciary duty toward either the corporation
or the source of the material nonpublic information. Second,
the holding in Dorozhko only creates liability for hacking that
is considered “plainly ‘deceptive.’”107 It correctly implies, however,
that not all hacking fits that mold; as such, the hacker-seller’s
liability under 10b-5 must turn on whether the method of hacking
is deceptive under 10b-5. Third, and most importantly, the
hacker-seller’s conduct does not directly relate to, (i.e., is not “in
connection with”), the unlawful securities transaction because
they do not actually trade on the information they acquire. These
three reasons indicate that 10b-5 is not the proper part of the
Exchange Act with which to charge hacker-sellers for insider
trading. Instead, Section 20(e), the aiding and abetting provision
of the Exchange Act, is a more effective provision with which to
charge hacker-sellers.
104 Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1251–56 (1998).
105 Nagy, supra note 55, at 1320.
106 Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49–51.
107 Id. at 51.
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Hacker-Sellers Are Not Fiduciaries

The classical theory of insider trading premises 10b-5
liability on a corporate insider’s breach of fiduciary duties owed
to the corporation and its shareholders by trading on material
nonpublic information or failing to disclose such information
before trading.108 Hacker-sellers do not work for the corporation
whose information they trade on or sell; as such, they are not
corporate insiders and owe no fiduciary duty to the corporation
or to its shareholders.109 Therefore, hacker-sellers cannot be
liable under the classical theory.
The absence of fiduciary duty manifests differently in
the misappropriation theory. In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court
premised the misappropriation theory on the breach of a fiduciary
duty owed to the source of the information. A misappropriator’s
“deception” occurs when he or she feigns “loyalty to the principal
while secretly converting the principal’s information for personal
gain.”110 All hackers, including hacker-sellers, cannot be held
under this standard because they have no loyalty to the source of
the information.111 They never agree to maintain the confidence of
the source’s information because they never transact with the
source from which they acquire the information. In fact, the
hacker-seller often does not even acquire the information from the
would-be-source itself.112 Put simply, there is no relationship
between the hacker-seller and the source that gives rise to a
fiduciary duty owed by the former to the latter; therefore, hackersellers also cannot be liable under the misappropriation theory.
B.

Not All Hacking Is “Plainly Deceptive”

While the previous section demonstrates how it is
relatively simple for hacker-sellers to evade liability under the
classical and misappropriation theories, it is more difficult for
them to escape the affirmative misrepresentation theory. While
the Dorozhko court’s discussion of deceptive conduct under the
affirmative misrepresentation theory is a step in the right
direction, it left several cracks for hacker-sellers to slip through.
This section picks up where the Second Circuit left off by
108 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that liability
under the classical theory is premised on an insider’s fiduciary duty to disclose material
nonpublic information).
109 Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49.
110 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997) (quoting Brief for the
United States, supra note 80, at 17).
111 Nagy, supra note 104, at 1253–54.
112 See, e.g., Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 43–44.
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qualifying its rudimentary distinction between misrepresenting
oneself to a computer and exploiting a structural weakness. The
court strongly implied that not all hacking would be considered
deceptive conduct but did not answer what conduct would or
would not be deceptive.113 The court correctly pointed out that
hacking involving affirmative misrepresentations to the computer
does carry 10b-5 liability, but hacking that exploits structural
deficiencies cannot carry 10b-5 liability because the computer is
not being “deceived” by the hack. As such, the affirmative
misrepresentation theory only applies to a subset of hackers,
regardless of whether they trade on the information themselves
or sell it to others and is, therefore, inadequate in imbuing
liability on hacker-sellers.
1. Misrepresentative Hacking Versus Structural
Hacking
Say Corporation X keeps its earnings reports in a
combination safe in the basement of its headquarters until they
are released to the public. Tanya Trader, an independent trader,
wants to acquire this information before it becomes public so she
can trade on it, but since she does not know how to break into
X’s safe to get the reports she hires Harry Hacker, a professional
safecracker, to do it for her. Harry has two ways to break into
the safe. He can misrepresent himself and appear as a legitimate
entrant by obtaining the combination and entering it, thereby
making the safe grant him access to its contents. Alternatively,
Harry can exploit structural weaknesses in the safe by drilling
into it, blowing its doors off, or stealing the entire physical object
to acquire the information. Harry and Tanya get the information
they desire regardless of which option Harry chooses; however,
Harry would only be liable for insider trading under the
affirmative misrepresentation theory for the former conduct
because Harry is deceiving the system into granting him
legitimate access. In the digital world, Harry’s two options are
also present, but manifest themselves in different ways.
a. Misrepresentative Hacking
Misrepresentative computer hacking describes conduct
where the hacker attempts to gain access to the computer or
information system by hiding his true identity and appearing
as a legitimate user. There are several ways the hacker can do
113

Id. at 51.
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this, including password cracking, phishing, viruses, worms,
and Trojan horses.
Password cracking is the process of recovering
passwords from data that has been stored or transmitted by a
computer system.114 The hacker runs a program that repeatedly
checks possible combinations against a custom character set
until it finds the right one. A common and extremely effective
example of password cracking is brute force, where the computer
program tries every type of password until it succeeds.115 The
time it takes to crack a password is proportional to bit
strength,116 which is the estimate of the average number of times
an attacker who does not have direct access to the password
would need to guess it correctly.117 Once the hacker gets the
correct password, the computer will grant him access as though
he were a legitimate user.
Phishing is the attempt to acquire sensitive information
by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic
communication.118 The hacker typically sends a seemingly benign
email, or “hook,” that victims receive directing them to a
fraudulent website where they are tricked into divulging sensitive
information by displaying messages such as “verify your account”
or “confirm billing information.”119 The fraudulent websites will be
crafted to look exactly like the real ones, and the user will be
deceived into thinking the prompts are legitimate when they are
not. Essentially, the fake websites are “bait” set by the hacker to
get a user, the “fish,” to reveal private information.
Viruses and worms are harmful computer programs that
modify other computer programs to replicate the virus or worm
repeatedly until the computer crashes. Once the program enters
the computer, it secretly prompts the computer’s operating
system to add a copy of the virus or worm to the target
program.120 The only difference between viruses and worms is
that the virus requires human action to infect the computer;
worms infect using a computer network, without human input.
114 WILLIAM E. BURR ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, ELECTRONIC AUTHENTICATION GUIDELINE 104 (2013).
115 Brute Force Attack, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/18
091/brute-force-attack [https://perma.cc/CC7L-PEFZ].
116 BURR ET AL., supra note 114, at 104–05.
117 Security Tip (ST04-002): Choosing and Protecting Passwords, US-CERT
(May 21, 2009), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-002 [https://perma.cc/2U7F-NZDR].
118 Zulfikar Ramzan, Phishing Attacks and Countermeasures, in HANDBOOK
OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY 433–34 (Peter Stavroulakis & Mark
Stamp eds., 2010).
119 Id.
120 Peter J. Denning, Computer Viruses, in COMPUTERS UNDER ATTACK:
INTRUDERS, WORMS, AND VIRUSES 285–87 (Peter J. Denning ed., 1990).
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In the securities context, the virus or worm is harmful when it
contains a payload, or code designed to exfiltrate data from the
host computer.121 The hacker dupes the user into allowing the
virus or worm to enter the computer by using tactics such as
phishing to make the message containing the virus or worm seem
harmless.122 Once the virus or worm has entered the computer, it
launches the payload to steal sensitive information from the user.
Trojan horses misrepresent themselves as useful or
routine in order to persuade a user to install it.123 Like viruses
or worms, Trojan horses are generally spread by some form of
social engineering124 where the user is duped into opening the
device—usually an email—that contains it.125 Their ability to
steal a user’s information once on the system depends on the
type of Trojan.126 For example, password-stealing Trojans look
for saved passwords on the user’s computer and then email
them to the perpetrator.127
Password cracking, phishing, viruses, worms, and Trojan
horses are all forms of misrepresentative hacking because the
hacker must appear legitimate to the user or computer in order
for these techniques to be successful. The hacker employs password
cracking or phishing to acquire the correct password and then
enters the system by logging in with the correct information.
The computer believes the hacker is a legitimate user because
the correct information was entered, so it grants the hacker
access. Similarly, the hacker appears as a legitimate entity
when employing a virus, worm, or Trojan horse by disguising the
malware in seemingly benign emails or websites; the users are
tricked into opening the email or interacting with the website
because they think it looks safe.128 In either case, the hacker is
121 Payload, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/5381/payload
[https://perma.cc/MN52-ZWFX].
122 What Is the Difference: Viruses, Worms, Trojans, and Bots?, CISCO, http://
www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/virus-worm-diffs.html [https://perma.cc/Y
D5N-WEWW].
123 CARL E. LANDWEHR ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH LAB., A TAXONOMY OF
COMPUTER PROGRAM SECURITY FLAWS, WITH EXAMPLES 7 (1993).
124 Social engineering is “the art of manipulating people so they give up
confidential information.” What Is Social Engineering?, WEBROOT, https://www.webroot.
com/us/en/home/resources/tips/online-shopping-banking/secure-what-is-social-engineering
[https://perma.cc/58K7-JPVQ]. Criminals or hackers use different tricks to masquerade as
harmless people—such as pretending to be a known friend of the user or sending the user
an email saying they won a contest—and ask the user to provide confidential information.
Id. By posing as someone the user trusts, the user is more inclined to divulge sensitive
information. Id.
125 See supra sources cited in notes 122–123.
126 Robert Siciliano, What Is a Trojan Horse?, INTEL SEC. (Oct. 27, 2014),
https://blogs.mcafee.com/consumer/trojan-horse/ [https://perma.cc/Q9Q2-2LQG].
127 Id.
128 LANDWEHR ET AL., supra note 123, at 7.
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misrepresenting his identity to the target to acquire sensitive
information; he is appearing as a legitimate entity to the
computer when, in fact, he is not.
It is this form of hacking that Dorozhko used to acquire
information about IMS Health’s earnings from Thomson
Financial.129 He deceived the Thomson Financial security system
by appearing as a legitimate user who had authorized access to
the confidential information about IMS Health.130 As such,
Dorozhko’s conduct was deceptive under 10b-5.
b. Structural Hacking
Structural hacking describes conduct where the hacker
exploits structural deficiencies in the computer to obtain valuable
information contained within. Like misrepresentative hacking,
there are several ways this can be done, such as physical
exploitation or code injections.
Not all hacking occurs digitally; “you can spend millions
of dollars protecting your network, but [many organizations] are
leaving the front door wide open.”131 It is often just as effective for
hackers to exploit physical components of the networks or the
facilities themselves to acquire the information they desire.132 The
physical design flaws in the rooms where the data is stored, such
as raised floors built for running cables and cooling apparatuses,
can easily be subjugated.133 Or perhaps, if they are bold enough,
the hacker can walk through the unlocked front door.134
Code injections are attacks in which hackers inject
malicious code into computer programs that override the
programs so they act according to the hacker’s wishes.135 A
common type of injection is the Structured Query Language
129 Posthearing Memorandum of Law at 4, 8, SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp.
2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2007) (No. 1:07-CIV-09606 (NRB)).
130 Id. at 4.
131 Kelly Jackson Higgins, Five Ways to (Physically) Hack a Data Center,
DARKREADING (May 17, 2010), http://www.darkreading.com/five-ways-to-(physically)hack-a-data-center/d/d-id/1133615 [https://perma.cc/KL7F-3PC9] (alteration in original)
(quoting Ryan Jones, senior security consultant with Trustwave’s SpiderLabs).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See, e.g., Steve Ragan, Hackers Suggest They Had Physical Access During
Attack on Sony Pictures, CSO (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2851649/
physical-security/hackers-suggest-they-had-physical-access-during-attack-on-sony-pictures.
html [http://perma.cc/EY4D-5N38] (discussing the ramifications of allegations that the
hackers who broke into Sony’s network had physical access because the network never locks
the doors to its actual databases and may have had inside help).
135 Raghunathan Srinivasan & Partha Dasgupta, Towards More Effective Virus
Detectors, ARIZ. STATE UNIV., http://cactus.eas.asu.edu/partha/Papers-PDF/2007/raghucsi.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VRT-ZMDS].
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(SQL) injection.136 SQL is the standard operating language in most
computers that helps users navigate information databases on all
computing platforms. An SQL injection attacks vulnerabilities in
this language137 by inserting a certain predesigned malicious code
that manipulates the SQL to grant the hacker unauthorized access.
Neither physical hacking nor SQL injections require the
hacker to misrepresent his identity to the computer or system
in order to gain unauthorized access. In fact, there is no need
for misrepresentation because the hacker does not attempt to
appear legitimate at all. Unlike misrepresentative hacks where
the hacker must trick the system into believing that nothing is
wrong because they are entering as seemingly legitimate users,
in structural hacks the system is aware that something is
wrong, but is powerless to fix the problem.
2. Misrepresentative and Structural Hacking Under
Dorozhko
Dorozhko hinted that hacking can be divided into these
two groups of conduct: misrepresentative hacking and structural
hacking. As this note argues, however, only misrepresentative
hacking gives rise to 10b-5 liability because the hacker
impersonates someone with legitimate access to the information
when he interacts with the computer, thereby satisfying the
deceptive device element of the statute. This analysis could
acquit hacker-sellers if they used structural hacking to acquire
the material nonpublic information, but cases like SEC v.
Dubovoy demonstrate that this is clearly not always the case.
The hackers in Dubovoy satisfied the deceptive device
requirement when they used password-based hacking to acquire
nonpublic press releases.138 However, they also hacked several
times using SQL injections, and this conduct did not involve a
deceptive device because they were exploiting structural
deficiencies instead of misrepresenting their identities to appear
as legitimate users.139 Therefore, these latter instances of
hacking do not give rise to 10b-5 liability because the deceptive
136 See Mike Chapple, What Is SQL?: Introduction to the Structured Query
Language, THOUGHTCO. (Dec. 11, 2016), https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-sql-1019769
[https://perma.cc/8D2G-R5PZ].
137 STEPHEN KOST, INTEGRITY CORP., AN INTRODUCTION TO SQL INJECTION
ATTACKS FOR ORACLE DEVELOPERS 4–6 (2004); see also Sumner Lemon, Mass SQL
Injection Attack Targets Chinese Web Sites, IDG NEWS SERV. (May 19, 2008), http://www.
pcworld.com/article/146048/article.html [https://perma.cc/FS6P-ZFGA].
138 Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 2,
at 21–22.
139 Id.
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device requirement is not satisfied. While the distinction
between the two types of hacking is important, it can only
partially exculpate hacker-sellers depending on the type of
hacking they employ.
C.

Why Charging Hacker-Sellers Under 10b-5 Stretches the
“In Connection With” Requirement Too Far

In Chiarella,140 O’Hagan,141 and Dorozhko,142 10b-5’s
requirement that the criminal must use a deceptive device “in
connection with” the sale of securities was satisfied because the
defendant used the deceptive device to acquire material nonpublic
information and then traded on that information himself. In the
case of a hacker-seller, the connection is much less apparent
because the same person did not perpetrate the deceptive act
and the securities transaction. More than one person’s actions
were required to create liability under 10b-5: The hackers hacked
but did not trade; the traders traded but did not hack. The
previous part of this note demonstrated that hacker-sellers are
partially exculpated from 10b-5 liability based on the type of hack
they carried out. By contrast, hacker-sellers fail to satisfy the “in
connection with” requirement regardless of the type of hack they
employ because they do not subsequently trade on the
information they acquire.
In O’Hagan, the Court construed the “in connection
with” requirement to mean that the “fraud is consummated, not
when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but
[rather] when . . . the information [is used] to purchase or sell
securities.”143 “This hurdle is necessary” in misappropriation cases
because the investor’s breach of fiduciary duty to his source occurs
not when he acquires the information, but when he uses it to
purchase or sell securities.144 Affirmative misrepresentation cases
differ because “the fraudulent act is the misrepresentation itself”;
140 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (explaining how the
defendant deciphered codes about potential tender offers and then purchased securities
in those companies before the offers were announced).
141 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997) (explaining how the
defendant learned of the tender offer his firm had planned and then bought the target
company’s stock before the offer was announced).
142 SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining how the
defendant hacked into Thomson Financial to acquire IMS press releases about its
earnings report and subsequently bought options in IMS before the report was released
to the public).
143 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656.
144 Elizabeth A. Odian, Note, SEC v. Dorozhko’s Affirmative Misrepresentation
Theory of Insider Trading: An Improper Means to a Proper End, 94 MARQ. L. REV.
1313, 1337 (2011).
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the perpetrator does not need to trade on the acquired information
to complete the fraud.145 However, the perpetrator is not liable
under 10b-5 at this point because the fraud has not yet occurred “in
connection with” a securities transaction—i.e., the trade on the
basis of the nonpublic information has not yet occurred.
It follows that 10b-5 liability must attach in affirmative
misrepresentation cases when the perpetrator actually trades
on information acquired via an affirmative misrepresentation.146
The perpetrator would also not be liable under 10b-5 if he chose
not to purchase or sell securities because his fraudulent conduct
of affirmatively misrepresenting his identity would not have
occurred “in connection with” a securities transaction. In the
hacker-seller paradigm, the hacker-seller acquires the material
nonpublic information, but sells that information to another
person to trade on instead of making the trade himself. Because
the hacker-seller does not make a trade, he does not engage in
any conduct in which 10b-5 liability attaches under the
affirmative misrepresentation theory. On the other hand, the
affirmative misrepresentation theory does create liability for
hacker-traders like Dorozhko who actually trade on the basis of
the stolen information.147
If courts wanted to find hacker-sellers liable under the
affirmative misrepresentation theory, they would have to stretch
the “in connection with” requirement beyond current case law to
include the purchase or sale of securities by another person: the
trader. In other words, the hacker-seller’s 10b-5 liability would
not be premised on his or her own conduct, but on the
recipient’s. Because the “in connection with” requirement is only
premised on the hacker-seller’s own conduct, and the hackerseller does not personally trade on the nonpublic information
acquired, the hacker-seller cannot be charged under 10b-5.
III.

ALTERNATE SOLUTIONS

This note argues that the aiding and abetting theory is
the most effective way to charge hacker-sellers with violating
the securities laws. But the aiding and abetting theory is not the
only way to charge hacker-sellers. The SEC has other options at
Id. at 1338.
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 48–49.
147 On October 17, 2017, Dorozhko hacked into a server at Thomson Financial,
stole IMS Health’s earnings report, and bought approximately $41,670.90 worth of put
options of IMS Health stock. Id. at 44. The next day, after the earnings were made public,
Dorozhko sold the put options six minutes after the opening bell for a profit of
$286,456.59. Id.
145
146
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its disposal; these options, however, are more controversial
because they could easily be manipulated to expand the net of
insider trading liability too far.
A.

Single Scheme Liability: The “In Connection With”
Requirement Revisited

The hacker-seller, by his actions, does not directly
satisfy the “in connection with” requirement of 10b-5 because
he does not actually commit the securities transaction using the
acquired nonpublic information.148 However, the Supreme Court
examined this element of 10b-5 in terms of independent events
in SEC v. Zandford,149 and its analysis lends itself to the case of
the hacker-seller quite nicely. In Zandford, the Court rejected
the respondent’s claims that his selling of his customer’s
securities and making personal use of the proceeds was, while
fraudulent, not sufficiently “in connection with” a securities
transaction because he only misappropriated the customer’s
assets and not particular securities.150 Justice Stevens, in his
majority opinion, found that the securities sales and Zandford’s
conversion of the proceeds were not independent events but were
done together in furtherance of Zandford’s single scheme of
defrauding his customer.151
Hacker-sellers present a comparable situation because
they do not actually commit the securities transaction, but hack
in furtherance of a single scheme to commit securities fraud,
which is perpetrated by the trader. Here, the key to linking the
hacker-seller to the securities violation is to prove that the
hacker’s actions and the trader’s actions are part of a single
scheme. Courts would have to do this on a case-by-case basis
using an extensive factual inquiry. Facts the court should look for
include the proximity of the hacker’s acquisition of the nonpublic
information to the trader’s securities transaction, the independent
value, if any, of the information obtained by the hacker-seller,152
and the method of the trader’s payment to the hacker-seller.153
See supra Section II.C.
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 The hacker-seller’s conduct would be more connected with the transaction
than when the nonpublic information has little value outside of its utility in securities
trading. Id. at 824.
153 It would be more indicative of a single scheme if the hacker-seller got paid
with a cut of the proceeds from the illicit trade instead of a flat fee at the onset. This
would imply that the hacker-seller was fully aware of what the trader was going to do
and speaks to their partnership in the securities violation.
148
149
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Treating the Hacker-Seller as a Tipper

Tipper-tippee liability has been applied in both the
classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading
liability on the basis that the tipper breached a fiduciary duty
by providing inside information to the tippee, and the tippee
knew or had reason to know that the tipper breached that duty.154
In other words, the tipper’s “deceptive device” was the fiduciary
breach, which was used “in connection with” a securities
transaction perpetrated by another person, the tippee.155 It is
conceivable then that the tipper/tippee paradigm could be
expanded beyond its fiduciary restraints to capture tippers that
employ any deceptive device in tipping nonpublic information.
The hacker-seller would fall under this new net because he is, in
effect, tipping the material nonpublic information to the trader.
And the tippee in this case would be well aware that the tipper
employed the deceptive device because the buyer is paying the
hacker-seller for the information with which he will commit the
securities violation. This new, wider net would still be in line
with the policy considerations from Dirks because it captures
tippees that “participa[te] after the fact”—i.e., after the tipper
employs the deceptive device.156
C.

Casting Too Big of a Net: A Warning from Texas Gulf
Sulphur

A crucial problem with alternatives A and B is that they
are sizeable extensions of well-grounded avenues of insider
trading liability that could cast too wide of a net and reel in too
many potential defendants beyond the hack-sell context. Since
Texas Gulf Sulphur, courts have espoused their trepidations
that the securities laws can easily be abused if their reach is
unduly protracted.157 These concerns are only magnified by the
154 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (application of tipper/tippee liability under
the classical theory of 10b-5); United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993)
(application of tipper/tippee liability under the misappropriation theory of 10b-5). The
personal benefit requirement from Dirks has not been adopted in every misappropriation
case. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1277–79 (11th Cir. 2003) (accepting the personal
benefit requirement because disclosure without it is not sufficient for liability under 10b5); Libera, 989 F.2d at 600 (suggesting that the personal benefit requirement is not
necessary because it is implied that the tipper will benefit from tipping the tippee).
155 Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (application of tipper/tippee liability under the classical
theory of 10b-5); Libera, 989 F.2d at 600 (application of tipper/tippee liability under the
misappropriation theory of 10b-5).
156 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
230, n.12 (1980)).
157 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867–70 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly, J., concurring) (discussing the ramifications of expansive insider trading
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expansion of the securities laws beyond their classical roots.
Alternative B, the tipper/tippee solution, is more prone to this
issue than alternative A, because tipper-tippee liability, even in
its original incarnation, lends itself to expansive application,
particularly with regard to the personal benefit requirement.158
In United States v. Salman, for example, the government argued
unsuccessfully before the Supreme Court that “a tipper personally
benefits whenever the tipper discloses confidential trading
information for a noncorporate purpose.”159 This would mean that
a gift to anyone—be it friend, family, coworker, etc.,—would
satisfy the Dirks personal benefit requirement.160 Although the
Supreme Court rejected this argument, it is a powerful
demonstration of how wide a net the personal benefit requirement
can potentially cast.
IV.

AN OLD SOLUTION TO A NEW CRIME: WHY AIDING AND
ABETTING LIABILITY EFFECTIVELY CAPTURES THE
HACKER-SELLER

The classical, misappropriation, and affirmative
misrepresentation theories all premise 10b-5 liability on the
perpetrator actually employing a deceptive device in executing
a securities transaction. Part II demonstrated the inability of
those theories to convict the hacker-seller; while the hackerseller may use a deceptive device, it will never be “in connection
with” a securities transaction because hacker-sellers do not
trade on the basis of the information themselves. Their conduct
more closely resembles a facilitation of insider trading than
actual insider trading, and charging hacker-sellers with aiding
and abetting insider trading under Section 20(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act is therefore more effective than charging them with
directly committing insider trading under 10b-5.

liability and characterizing them as “frightening”); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (warning against the dangers of “vexatious
[securities fraud] litigation”).
158 Donald C. Langevoort, The Demise of Dirks: Shifting Standards for TipperTippee Liability, INSIGHTS, June 1994, at 24; see also Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the
Remote Tippee, 41 GONZAGA L. REV. 181, 217 (2005–2006) (arguing that the more remote
the tippee, it is “likely that the tippee is being prosecuted for mere possession of confidential
information because of the absence of the requisite knowledge of the breach of duty”).
159 Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 426–27 (2016).
160 Id. at 427.
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Aiding, Abetting, and the Securities Exchange Act

Congress expressly provided for prosecution of those
who aid and abet violators of the securities laws in the 1934
Securities Exchange Act.161 Section 20(e) allows for prosecution
of one who “knowingly or recklessly provides substantial
assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this
chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under this chapter”
by the SEC and they will be held just as culpable as the person
to whom they provide assistance.162 Put another way, in order to
aid and abet, one must seek “by his actions to make [the
underlying crime] succeed.”163 Over the next six decades, almost
every circuit court of appeals endorsed a tort-law based
methodology for analyzing the validity of civil liability for aiding
and abetting.164 This approach requires the plaintiff to prove (1)
that there was a primary violation of the securities act by a
third party; (2) that the alleged aider and abettor must have
knowledge of the primary violation; and “(3) ‘substantial
assistance’ by the alleged aider-abettor in achievement of the
primary violation.”165
In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, the Supreme Court denied the applicability of this test
to private rights of action.166 In his majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy demonstrated that Congress had “taken a statute-bystatute approach to civil aiding and abetting liability,” and
pointed out that Congress did not expressly provide for a
private aiding and abetting cause of action in the Securities
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012).
Id.
163 In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 182 (2d Cir.
2013) (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)).
164 Sean G. Blackman, Comment, An Analysis of Aider and Abettor Liability
Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Central Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1323, 1347–48 n.155 (1995) (listing
the accepted theories of aiding and abetting liability as securities violations from all
eleven circuit courts); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (AM. LAW
INST. 1979) (This provision of the Restatement is the tort-law basis from which the
circuit courts derived the aiding and abetting theories they endorsed.).
165 Blackman, supra note 164, at 1347–48 n.155.
166 511 U.S. 164 (1994). Central Bank of Denver was a trustee for a bond issued
by the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority. Id. at 167. The bonds
required that the underlying securities must be worth at least 160% of the total
outstanding principal and interest on the bond and that AmWest Development give
Central Bank an annual report confirming that valuation. Id. After becoming aware that
the test was not being met, Central Bank was advised by AmWest to wait to review the
underlying securities themselves until after the bonds were issued. Id. at 167–68. Before
Central Bank could perform the review, Colorado Springs defaulted on the bonds. Id. at
168. First Interstate Bank, the buyer of the bonds, sued AmWest and Central Bank,
alleging that Central Bank aided and abetted AmWest’s fraud under 10b-5. Id.
161
162
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Exchange Act but had included one in other statutes created at
the same time.167 Based on this, Justice Kennedy reasoned there
could be no private aiding and abetting cause of action implied in
the Act’s language.168 The opinion did not clearly state whether it
barred government causes of action under an aiding and abetting
theory, so Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995 to provide some much needed
clarity.169 The PSLRA explicitly stated inter alia that the SEC is
able to bring aider and abettor claims, and it has since brought
several cases under this theory.170
For instance, in SEC v. DiBella, a Connecticut senator
convinced the state treasurer to invest money from the state’s
retirement trust fund with a particular asset management
firm, for which he was paid a finder’s fee.171 After the treasurer
pled guilty to federal racketeering charges, the SEC brought
charges against the senator for aiding and abetting the
treasurer.172 The Second Circuit upheld the senator’s conviction
because the SEC presented substantial evidence showing that
the senator knew about the investment scheme, helped the
treasurer invest in the asset management firm, and persuaded
the treasurer to increase his investments in order to get a
higher fee.173 These actions amounted to aiding and abetting
because the senator did not commit the fraud himself, but
provided substantial assistance to the treasurer who did.174
Conversely, in SEC v. Papa, the First Circuit rejected
the SEC’s theory that three executives of Putnam Fiduciary Trust
Company aided and abetted three other executives’ scheme to
defraud a client by helping them cover up their failure to timely
invest the client’s assets in a defined benefit plan in early 2001,
costing the client $4 million.175 The SEC alleged that the three
defendants signed letters to Putnam’s external auditor in 2002
and 2003 that stated they were “unaware of any uncorrected
errors, frauds or illegal acts” in connection with the transaction,
but the First Circuit was not persuaded because those denials,
while wrongful, occurred more than a year after the
Id. at 182.
Id. at 184–85.
169 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104,
109 Stat. 737, 757 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
170 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006); see also S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 13 (1995) (stating
that the PSLRA helped “clarify[ ] the ability of the SEC to bring aiding and abetting claims”).
171 SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 558–60 (2d Cir. 2009).
172 Id. at 560.
173 Id. at 565–67.
174 Id. at 567.
175 SEC v. Papa, 555 F.3d 31, 33–34 (1st Cir. 2009).
167
168
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transaction had been completed.176 The court said that
convicting these defendants would have extended aiding and
abetting liability too far, for one cannot aid and abet a fraud
that has already occurred.177
These cases demonstrate how the courts have not let the
SEC run rampant with charging nonprimary violators—or those
who did not commit the actual trade but may still have liability—
with aiding and abetting violations of the securities laws. The
next section applies the aiding and abetting theory to the hackerseller paradigm, and argues that charging hacker-sellers under
the aiding and abetting theory does not, as feared by the Papa
court, extend aiding and abetting liability too far.
B.

Why Aiding and Abetting Liability Is a More Effective
Method for Charging Hacker-Sellers with Insider Trading

The most compelling reason that the aiding and
abetting theory is better suited for charging hacker-sellers with
insider trading than 10b-5 is that the theory properly
encapsulates the hacker-seller’s conduct. The hacker-seller is
better characterized as a facilitator of insider trading than as a
primary culprit because it is difficult to assess the hacker’s
conduct as giving rise to primary insider trading liability.178
Charging the hacker under the aiding and abetting theory
appropriately treats the conduct as secondary to the primary
insider trading violation that was perpetrated not by the
hacker-seller, but by the actual trader.
A breakdown of circuit courts’ three-pronged approach to
prosecuting aiders and abettors of securities laws illuminates
this idea. The primary securities violation is the actual trade the
recipient of the information commits on the basis of the
information the hacker-seller provides. The relationship between
the hacker-seller and the trader mirrors a tipper-tippee
relationship as seen in Dirks.179 The hacker-seller would be the
tipper who obtained the material nonpublic information and
provided it to the tippee, the trader, to trade on. The tippee is the
trader, who commits the primary securities violation by trading
on material nonpublic information supplied by the tipper.
The hacker-seller must also have knowledge of the
primary actor’s—the trader’s—impending securities violation.
Id. at 34–36.
Id. at 37.
178 See supra Part II (discussing why the hacker-seller cannot be charged
under the three existing theories of primary insider trading liability).
179 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
176
177
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The hacker-seller must be aware of the trader’s intent to trade
on the basis of the information supplied. It is unlikely that the
hacker-seller would give the nonpublic information away
without knowing what the trader plans to do with the
information once acquired. This knowledge requirement is
satisfied if the hacker-seller is hired to acquire information for
the trader, or if the hacker conspires with the trader, because
in both scenarios the hacker is still aware of the trader’s intent
to trade on the basis of the newly acquired information. So long
as the hacker-seller knows the trader will trade on the basis of
the information acquired, the knowledge requirement is
satisfied. The final prong asks whether the secondary actor
provided substantial assistance to the primary actor. Here, the
hacker-seller provides substantial assistance to the underlying
trade by acquiring the information used to commit the primary
securities violation and by providing said information to the
trader in advance of the transaction. Without the hackerseller’s actions, the trade cannot occur. Like the senator in
DiBella, the hacker-seller’s actions occur before the actual
trade and facilitate the primary actor’s, in this case, the
trader’s, securities violation.180
Although this approach still premises the hacker-seller’s
liability on the actions of another person, it successfully
attaches liability to the hacker-seller by employing a different
analysis than the affirmative misrepresentation theory. It is
difficult to capture hacker-sellers under the affirmative
misrepresentation theory because that theory attaches liability
to the violator when the trade on the basis of material
nonpublic information occurs, not when the information is
wrongfully acquired.181 Since hacker-sellers sell the information
to another person—the trader—instead of trading on it
themselves, their conduct is therefore not “in connection with” a
securities transaction under the Exchange Act.182 The aiding and
abetting theory targets this exact kind of culprit, one who does
not commit the primary violation (in this case, securities fraud),
but through whose conduct another person can. While the
tangential relationship between the hacker-seller and the trader
is the undoing of the affirmative misrepresentation theory, it is
the lynchpin of the aiding and abetting theory.
More importantly, the language of Section 20(e) allows
the hacker-seller to be charged with the primary offense, too.
180
181
182

SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 567 (2d Cir. 2009).
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section II.C.
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18 U.S.C. Section 2(a) reads, “[w]hoever commits an offense against
the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or
procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”183 Section
20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act adopts this language for
securities violations, allowing for those convicted of aiding and
abetting a violation of the securities laws to be liable for the actual
violation too.184 In the case of the hacker-seller, this means that if
he is charged with aiding and abetting the trader’s securities
violation, then he can be held liable for that violation too.
C.

Policy Considerations Supporting the Aiding and
Abetting Theory

The aiding and abetting theory gives the SEC the ability
to prosecute hacker-sellers under the securities laws. While it
is possible to prosecute them under different federal statutes too,
the securities laws should not be left out because they are a much
stronger deterrent against their criminal conduct and charging
hacker-sellers under the securities laws comports with public
policy considerations that have supported the securities laws
since their inception.
1. Securities Laws Impose Stricter Penalties than the
Alternatives
Hacker-sellers actually commit crimes that are covered
by three different criminal support statutes: the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA) prohibits the hacking itself,185 and the
Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud Statutes proscribe the subsequent
sale of the material nonpublic information.186 All three statutes
carry similar sentences: defendants convicted under them can be
fined up to $1 million, imprisoned up to twenty years,187 or both.188
18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012).
185 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)–(c). The CFAA prohibits “intentionally access[ing] a
[protected] computer without authorization” and obtaining “information contained in a
financial record [belonging to] a financial institution.” Id. § 1030(a)(2)(A). “[P]rotected
computer” is defined under § 1030(e)(2) to mean a computer exclusively used by a
financial institution or one that “is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”
Id. § 1030(e)(2).
186 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. The Mail Fraud Statute and Wire Fraud
Statute prohibit fraudulent schemes to deprive others of money or property using the
mails or wires in furtherance of that scheme. Id.
187 See Nate Raymond, Insider Traders in U.S. Face Longer Prison Terms,
Reuters Analysis Shows, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/usinsidertrading-prison-insight-idUSKBN0GX0A820140902 [https://perma.cc/VXK6-RKUP].
188 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 1341, 1343. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 increased
the maximum prison term from five years to twenty. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
183

184
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The length of imprisonment largely correlates with the amount of
trading gains, but the average sentence is usually very short.
From 2008 to 2013, insider trading defendants were sentenced for
an average of 17.3 months of jail time.189
The Securities Act provides the SEC with a far more
potent arsenal with which it can penalize hacker-sellers in
addition to the sentences available under the fraud statutes,
including injunctive relief, asset freezing, and civil penalties up to
three times the illegal profits made or the losses avoided from the
securities violation.190 However, the two strongest deterrents
available to the SEC are disgorgement and repatriating profits
made by foreign defendants. Disgorgement dissuades securities
violations by depriving perpetrators of profits obtained through
securities violations and prevents their unjust enrichment.191
The SEC has entered into numerous agreements with foreign
countries allowing the pursuit of international violators of
American securities laws.192 This ability is crucial to the case of
hacker-sellers because they will still be within the SEC’s grasp if
they sell the information to foreign traders who use it to trade on
American securities. The CFAA, Mail Fraud Statute, and Wire
Fraud Statute do not provide such capabilities.193
2. Flexibility of the Securities Laws
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were construed very broadly
with the goal of “encompass[ing] the infinite variety of devices by
which undue advantage may be taken of investors and others.”194
The Supreme Court has espoused this sentiment several times
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903(a)–(b), 116 Stat. 745, 805 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1341, 1343 (2012)).
189 Raymond, supra note 187.
190 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1), 78u-1, 78u-2 (2012); see also WILLIAM K.S. WANG &
MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 639–41 (3d ed. 2010); Securities Fraud, 52 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1567, 1625–37 (2015); see supra Section II.C.
191 See SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In a securities
enforcement action . . . ‘disgorgement’ is not available primarily to compensate victims.
Instead, disgorgement has been used . . . to prevent wrongdoers from unjustly enriching
themselves through violations, which has the effect of deterring subsequent fraud.” (footnote
omitted)); SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing the proper level of
disgorgement as “the difference between the price of . . . [the stock] when purchased on
inside information and [its] price after the disclosure of the inside information”); Tex. Am.
Oil Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 44 F.3d 1557, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“When those injured
are not restored to their previous position the disgorgement partakes not of restitution, but
of recovery by government of the illegal gains for remedial and enforcement purposes.”).
192 Securities Fraud, supra note 190, at 1633–35 (explaining the various
agreements the SEC has entered into with foreign countries or organizations that allow
it to conduct international investigations and discussing Congressional legislation that
enables the SEC to take action based on foreign convictions).
193 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 1341, 1343.
194 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., No. 8-3925, 40 SEC Docket 907, 911 (Nov. 8, 1961).
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over the decades, saying that it must interpret the securities
laws “not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate
its remedial purposes.”195 Furthermore, and perhaps more
appropriately, Congress has pointed out that the securities laws
should adapt to changing “technological conditions.”196
This adaptability allows the securities laws to be applied
to several different types of conduct. It is unlikely that when
Congress promulgated the Securities Exchange Act,197 it envisioned
computer hacking as a method by which insider trading could
occur.198 The first known instance of computer hacking occurred in
1980, well after the Securities Exchange Act was enacted.199
Therefore, hacking cannot be captured by the securities laws if
the laws are interpreted strictly, but it would be captured by the
more flexible interpretation that Congress has suggested.200
3. Economic Unfairness
One goal of 10b-5, and the securities laws as a whole, is
to protect the integrity of the markets from abuse by those who
use nonpublic information for advantageous trades.201 The
“integrity of the markets” rationale is grounded in the notion
that the price of shares as they are traded on the markets
reflects all publicly available information.202 As one court put it,
“it is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who
does not rely on market integrity. Who would knowingly roll
the dice in a crooked crap game?”203 The hacker-seller’s actions fly
in the face of this central tenet of 10b-5 because they facilitate
trading based on nonpublic information. The outsider would then
buy or sell at an inaccurate price because he cannot take into
account the change in the price as a result of the illicit trade,
thereby being deprived of the full gain he would have obtained
had he traded on the security’s true value. Not only would this
195 SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)); see, e.g., Chadbourne & Parke LLP v.
Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202–04, 206
(1976); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
196 H.R. REP. NO. 94-29, at 92 (1975).
197 The 73rd Congress promulgated the Securities Exchange Act in 1934.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a–qq (2012)).
198 See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2009).
199 3 JAMES W. CORTADA, THE DIGITAL HAND: HOW COMPUTERS CHANGED THE
WORK OF AMERICAN PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIES 135 (2008).
200 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
201 77 CONG. REC. 2301, 2934 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Chapman).
202 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
203 Id. at 246–47 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535,
538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
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be fundamentally unfair, but it would create an inefficient
market to the outsider who would be deprived of the
opportunity to buy or sell at the right price.204 While the blanket
characterization of insider trading as unfair has been challenged
on the grounds that it can create a more efficient market,205 this
argument applies only when the information that was traded on
is obtained legally. The argument that insider trading can
sometimes create a more efficient market does not apply to
illegal insider trading, and the hacker-seller certainly acquires
the information they sell via illegal means.206
CONCLUSION
Hacker-sellers present a new type of insider trading
culprit whose liability under 10b-5 remains outside the scope of
the classical, misappropriation, and affirmative misrepresentation
theories. This note suggests that they should be charged instead
under Section 20(e) with aiding and abetting the securities
violation perpetrated by the recipient of the material nonpublic
information. It is more appropriate to charge them this way
because their conduct will be properly characterized as facilitating
the primary securities violation while simultaneously imbuing
liability for the underlying violation.
Charging hacker-sellers this way is supported by the
underlying policy considerations of the securities laws and
ensures that hacker-sellers will be subject to stronger penalties
than those available under other federal laws. The SEC can
prosecute this new breed of insider trader, but it should do so
under the aider and abettor theory codified in Section 20(e)
instead of 10b-5.
Ryan H. Gilinson†
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violates in his acquisition of material nonpublic information).
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